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ABSTRACT. Starting with Husserl’s phenomenology and advancing to Jean-Luc 
Marion’s and Jean-Yves Lacoste’s phenomenology and to the revealed theology, 
this paper aims to answer the question: “How does the Truth appear?” Husserl’s 
phenomenological reduction made the appearance of God, who remained in an 
absolute transcendence, impossible; but John’s Gospel states that Christ is the 
Truth. We accept both of these opinions and offer the following answers: the 
religious phenomena, which have to do with a religious life and knowledge, could 
appear after one ignores or weakens the Husserlian epoché; God could appear if 
the phenomenological reduction became a reduction to givenness; the religious 
phenomena could appear after a theological counter-reduction, which separated 
itself from phenomenological rigor and belonged to theology. 
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The question about the appearance of the Truth points simultaneously 
towards two disciplines which broaden its horizon: phenomenology and 
theology. As a science of phenomena, the former teaches us that the discourse 
about appearance is included in its very concept, given that the phenomenon 
(phainomenon) is what appears, what manifests itself, what shows itself.1 The 
latter, theology, simply affirms the identity between God-man and the truth in the 
unequivocal statement from John’s Gospel: “I am the way, the truth, and the life” 
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(John 14: 6). This statement resembles a phenomenological one because, in 
phenomenology, “truth is what appears.”2 This is why, in this article, the question 
about the possibility of appearance of the truth will become a question about the 
possibility of appearance of God. 
The answer—an easy one from within theology—is a statement of faith 
over which philosophy has no real domination: Truth appears as a revelation 
and as man’s answer to the call of God throughout the history of salvation. Then 
again, how legitimate is the encounter between theology and phenomenological 
philosophy if the topic of appearance belongs to both of them? Can the religious 
truth appear while the phenomenological reductions are active? What 
relationships are possible between the two disciplines in this case? 
The following pages examine the legitimacy of a conversation about 
Christ the Truth within Husserl’s tradition of thought. If, as we will prove later on, 
Husserl’s phenomenological reduction eliminates God, who thus remains in an 
absolute transcendence, how reasonable is the “theological turn in French 
phenomenology,” which practices a discourse based on the Revelation (therefore, 
a theological one in its intention), but which claims to remain phenomenological 
in its method and rigor? The thesis that we will support is that the encounter 
between phenomenology and theology would not have been possible without 
weakening or rethinking that Husserlian reduction, to make way for new 
reductions that have to do with religious life and knowledge. 
The Phenomenological Reduction and the Rejection of Transcendence 
Phenomenology is a philosophical method and line of thought that aims 
to delineate the phenomena existing in our mind at the level of the intentional 
consciousness. Trying to avoid any theoretical and metaphysical presuppositions 
to go “Back to the things themselves!”—according to one of Husserl’s principles—
phenomenology aspires to be “a science of sciences” and “a theory of theories.”3 
It attempts to substantiate the other sciences transcendentally and to grant them 
a philosophical unity, without claiming to replace them. The transcendental 
sphere of phenomena appears after the phenomenological reduction, which 
involves bracketing the existence of the world, which continues to exist for me as 
part of my intentional consciousness.4 Husserl takes the concept of intentionality 
from Franz Brentano and observes that all the acts of our consciousness are 
intentional, pointing towards contents of consciousness. This idea opens up the 
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meditation towards two directions: on the one hand, towards contents of 
consciousness—intuitions, noemata or cogitata, the noematic direction; on the 
other hand, towards the descriptions of the acts themselves—such as perception, 
memory, retention, i.e. towards intentions and the cogito itself. The phenomena 
are constituted in the consciousness and the constitution of the transcendental 
world is an infinite guiding idea.5 
For Husserl, phenomenology is an eidetic science that studies ideas, 
essences, principles, the a priori universal.6 Therefore, Husserl talks not only about 
a transcendental reduction, but also about a categorial reduction to the essence of 
phenomena, and both of them define the proper meaning of a transcendental 
phenomenology.7 Knowledge is a constitution in the transcendental consciousness 
of the phenomena obtained after making those reductions; it is a unity of fulfillment 
by gradual confirmations and refusals, and the truth belongs to the apodictic 
evidence.  
Under these circumstances, the phenomenological reduction is the most 
radical obstacle to the possibility of appearance of a religious transcendence. 
Husserl defined reduction as follows: 
 
“Formulated explicitly, the philosophical ἐποχή that we are undertaking 
shall consist of our completely abstaining from any judgment regarding the 
doctrinal content of any previous philosophy and effecting all of our 
demonstrations within the limits set by this abstention.”8 
 
The reduction can be split into a negative movement, which eliminates the 
theories and prejudices that block the way to the phenomenon—affecting 
theology as a corpus of teachings prior to the reduction—and a positive one, that 
returns to the pure phenomena in the way they give themselves.9 Phenomenology 
sheds light on the transcendental realm of phenomena, surpassing naïve 
objectivism and granting access to those phenomena through intentionality. The 
movement of abstention (epoché) is essential for the refusal of religion, which 
enters alongside other doctrines in the realm of the suspension that addresses any 
philosophical and scientific hypotheses. Bracketing the existence of the world to 
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reveal the transcendental realm does not lead to a fantasy, because, as Husserl 
said, fantasy cannot be excluded, cannot be put out of action.10 The criterion for 
the difference between illusion and reality is bracketing itself. Applied to theology, 
we can observe that, from Husserl’s perspective, there is nothing to bracket; 
maybe just the text of the Scripture, which we read because it shows itself to us 
and reveals meanings, but it could be considered a fantasy, which does not ensure 
the evidence of the theological meanings it contains, only the existence of the 
Scripture as a book that is within my intuitive horizon. Given these circumstances, 
the theology of that book does not resist the phenomenological reduction. 
However, does the theology of liturgical experience resist? No, because it can fall 
under the same hits, as a theatrical play reflecting a fantasy. The reduction purifies 
and does not annihilate, its main goal being to discuss the phenomena that remain 
within the field of consciousness after bracketing. Those phenomena belong to the 
field of knowledge but “with a change of sign,” namely outside the natural attitude 
and according to a transcendental attitude.11 We must emphasize that this 
reduction is plural, because Husserl talks about “phenomenological reductions.”12 
We can interpret this plurality in two ways: on the one hand, as applying the 
reduction to the different fields of factual and eidetic sciences—the reduction 
of physics, psychology, logic, and others; on the other hand, as a gradual, never-
ending reduction. Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and even Husserl affirm the 
gradual nature of the phenomenological reduction. Marion also implies it in his 
principle “So much reduction, so much givenness.”13 The most important aspect 
of this discussion is the fact that reduction does not bracket only the existence 
of the world, but all our theories and prejudices as well, which is very difficult 
to do completely. 
Though comparable to a religious conversion, the reduction remains 
problematic for religion itself and for the absolute transcendence of God due to 
its passing from the natural attitude to the transcendental one.14 In fact, three 
transcendences remain after the reduction: the transcendence of the world, 
which is different from noemata, the transcendence of the pure ego, which is 
different from noesis, and the transcendence of God.15 
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Firstly, the transcendence of the world distinguishes between the content 
of the consciousness after the phenomenological reduction—those noemata—
and the objects that constitute their references. Noesis–noemata are immanent 
to the consciousness, but the noematic objects remain transcendent, according to 
Husserl. In metaphysical terms, this is a relationship between the images and the 
objects of the intuition; noema is the image immanent to consciousness, whereas 
the object remains transcendent. This is an admitted limit of Husserl’s 
phenomenology, characterized by the limit established by the reduction: even 
though it questions the transcendent reality of our consciousness, Husserlian 
phenomenology does not intend to offer a science of its own or to answer the 
question of whether this is possible, but focuses on the immanent and on the 
phenomenological stream of the intentional consciousness:16 
 
“That acts of thought at times refer to transcendent, even to non-
existent and impossible objects, is not to the case. For such direction to 
objects, such presentation and meaning of what is not really (reel) part 
of the phenomenological make-up of our experiences, is a descriptive 
feature of the experiences in question, whose sense it should be possible 
to fix and clarify by considering the experiences themselves. In no other 
way would it be possible.”17 
 
Another limit is given by the very importance of objects in Husserl’s 
phenomenology. If the principle “back to the things themselves” targets the 
objectivity of the phenomena appearing after the reduction, then it ignores, for 
the most part, non-objective phenomena. Husserl even claims in Ideas I that a 
transcendency that lacks the present perception and the phenomenological 
constitution would be nonsensical.18 
Secondly, there is also a transcendency of the pure ego, inasmuch as it 
joins the acts and the noetic–noematic contents while eluding the field that 
appears after the phenomenological reduction. Being imperative to every 
cogitatio and remaining identical to itself despite its changing acts, “it cannot in 
any sense be a really inherent part or moment of the mental processes 
themselves.”19 The pure ego remains irreducible20, indescribable and pure 
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emptiness, has “no explicatable content,”21 which is why it has a paradoxical 
“transcendency within immanency”: 
 
“If we retain a pure Ego as a residuum after our phenomenological 
exclusion of the world and of the empirical subjectivity included in it (and 
an essentially different pure Ego for each stream of mental processes), 
then there is presented in the case of that Ego a transcendency of a 
peculiar kind—one which is not constituted—a transcendency within 
immanency.”22 
 
Both transcendencies—of the world and of the pure ego—extend to all 
situations where the intention points to the phenomena of the others (the 
problem of intersubjectivity) or to the stream of mental processes of other egos.23 
Thirdly, due to its problem with intersubjectivity, the phenomenological 
reduction becomes even more problematic with regard the divine alterity, which 
is considered radically transcendent. Husserl’s phenomenology cannot make way 
for God in its analytical field, because of its phenomenological reduction, which 
eliminates all presuppositions and is descriptive and essentialist. The 
transcendental subjectivity which exercises a phenomenological reduction can 
accept only an immanent God, constituted phenomenologically, but this is absurd 
because God has no place in noetic–noematic correlations.24 In paragraph 58 from 
Ideas I, Husserl claims that the phenomenological reduction excludes God. 
Although Husserl accepts a teleological argument implicitly and speaks of God as 
a “base” and not as a “physical causal reason,” he considers God’s transcendence 
to be a radical one, different from both the transcendence of the world towards 
consciousness and the transcendence of the pure ego. The absolute of God is 
different from the absolute of pure consciousness.25 Here, we may notice the 
“methodological atheism” of phenomenology, which is specific to Husserl’s and 
Heidegger’s thought. 
To sum up, the phenomenological reduction excludes the possibility of 
God’s appearance, which cannot be analyzed within phenomenology. However, 
some solutions were found to overcome this interdiction: (1) weakening or 
ignoring the reduction—a kind of reduction of the reduction— and using a non-
Husserlian and non-rigorous discourse (this is the solution of Husserl himself, 
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Levinas, Michel Henry, and Jean-Yves Lacoste); (2) re-thinking the reduction to 
allow God’s appearance (as in the case of Jean-Luc Marion’s reduction to 
givenness); and (3) allowing the theological reductions present for phenomena 
of faith and admitting the possibility of a noetic–noematic analysis that accepts 
the irreducibility of God (Jean-Yves Lacoste’s solution). 
 
The Reduction of the Reduction 
 
In a “Note” from Ideas I, Husserl talks about a cosmological and 
teleological argument of the world, starting from the idea of the order of the 
universe and of the visible telos. He observes that one can rationally presuppose 
a theological principle of absolute transcendence, but this principle cannot be 
analyzed phenomenologically: “The ordering principle of the absolute must be 
found in the absolute itself, considered purely as absolute.”26 This idea opens the 
field towards the possibility of discourses other than the phenomenological one, 
discourses that can legitimately refer to God: 
 
“In other words, since a worldly God is evidently impossible and since, 
on the other hand, the imanence of God in absolute consciousness cannot 
be taken as immanence in the sense of being as a mental process (which 
would be no less counter-sensical), ther must be, therefore, within the 
absolute stream of consciousness and its infinities, modes in which 
transcendencies are made known other than the constituting of physical 
realities as unities of harmonious appearances; and ultimately there 
would also have to be intuitional manifestations to which a theoretical 
thinking might conform, so that, by following them rationally, it might 
make intelligible the unitary rule of the supposed theological principle. It 
is likewise evident, then, that this rule must not be taken to be ‘causal’ in 
the sense determined by the concept of causality as obtaining in Nature, 
a concept attuned to realities and the functional interdependencies 
proper to their particular essence.”27 
 
Firstly, this paragraph distinguishes between the worldly transcendence 
and the absolute transcendence—adequate to God; the latter reappears at the 
end in the form of the rejection that God could be a worldly cause. As a foundation 
of the world, God cannot be a “cause” in any ordinary meaning, for there is no 
relationship between cause and effect, as in physical causality; instead, He is a 
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foundation visible only through faith. The causality of the world is a horizontal 
one and does not need to be founded by divine transcendence. Here, Husserl 
seems to think that God’s transcendence is transcendent to the transcendence of 
the world, namely a superior transcendence. The difference between the 
mundane sphere and divine one can also be observed from the fact that the 
phenomenological constitutions are not adequate to God. 
Another important idea is that Husserl accepts the legitimacy of other, no 
less rational ways of thinking than the phenomenological one, but which do not 
exercise the phenomenological reduction, nor do they use intuitions that could 
be accepted by theological thinking. 
Finally, the “supposed” theological principle of Husserl’s text leads to the 
possibility of a counter-reduction: what if what we see in the religious 
phenomena belongs to our sphere, our faith, and our Christian teachings? 
Through this note, Husserl opens a field for religious analysis, a less 
rigorous discourse than the phenomenological one, with no phenomenological 
reduction. Husserl himself talks about God in his manuscripts, ignoring reduction, 
exercising a phenomenology without epoché. No matter where we situate 
Husserl’s ideas about religion and God, they are essential for the legitimacy of 
such discourses. Thus, Husserl—who converted from Judaism to Protestant 
Christianism—writes about the superiority and the universality of monotheism, 
defending the Judeo-Christian Revelation, about the importance of the teleology 
for understanding God, who is not a totality of monads, but an entelechy. He also 
defines God as infinite life, love, will, and happiness; he speaks about the “ethical 




How does the truth appear? Jean-Luc Marion gives another answer, 
trying  
 
“to broaden the meanings of phenomenology and to propose a 
phenomenology of givenness which overcomes the phenomenologies of 
Husserl and Heidegger. His reduction to givenness is radical and goes 
beyond the reduction to objectness (Husserl) and the reduction to 
beingness (Heidegger). Its role is that of freeing the phenomena from 
anything a priori, which favors the act of discussing the phenomena 
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related to religious experience and Christian Revelation. These 
phenomena overwhelm human understanding; in Marion’s terms, this 
means that they are given in excess, saturating our concepts with 
intuition; hence, the name of saturated phenomena.”29 
 
However, is that reduction to givenness free from a theological counter-
reduction? Doesn’t the same Husserlian “supposed” theological principle appear 
here? The remaining pages will try to analyze such a theological counter-
reduction, because it is another answer to our question. 
A religious phenomenon is an “appearance” of transcendence within the 
field of intentional consciousness. A good example is an epiphany, the 
manifestation of the divine through daily phenomena. Even the Christian feast of 
the Epiphany is the revelation of God incarnate as the Son, revelated by the Father 
and the Holy Spirit. The history and the philosophy of religions show us other 
religious revelations: ontophanies—revelations of the true reality or Being—and 
cratophanies—revelations of the power of the sacred. The phenomenology of 
religions speaks about privileged objects through which the sacred manifests 
itself, as well as about sacred spaces, e.g., temples, and sacred times, e.g., feast 
days. Homo religiosus, who is present in all societies and cultures of the world, 
understands well such phenomena. 
What is more difficult, however, is to define the religious phenomenon 
starting from an atheist perspective. A phenomenological reduction excludes the 
sacred, as well as the religious phenomena. There are religious people who 
transform, by an act of transfiguration, the normal phenomena, giving them 
exterior meanings. What happens in the intentional conscientiousness in such 
cases when a religious meaning is granted to a phenomenon that, for non-
believers, shows no transcendence? For a non-religious consciousness, intuition 
and concept can arrive at a certain adequacy and can offer the phenomenon in 
itself, but without any religious connotation. In the same way, if the phenomenon 
is an event, surprising and saturating the concept, the religious content is not a 
necessity. The art lover who admires an Orthodox icon might see a saturated 
phenomenon without any religious saturation, only with an artistic one. The 
difference between the non-religious consciousness and the religious one is given 
by the absence or the presence of faith. At first sight, such a distinction annihilates 
the specificity of the religious phenomenon, because a faithful consciousness only 
adds a “supposed” theological principle that is not present in the phenomenon. 
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Such an act could be the creation of a counter-reduction. Even Kierkegaard 
admitted, in his Philosophical fragments, that man assigns divine ideality to the 
empirical world.30  
Holiness—as a manifestation of God’s power and love—is not limited by 
the existence of faith; it can arise even for the non-believer, causing his 
conversion. However, this is the exception, because the rule is that a miracle is 
conditioned. Christ asked: “Do you believe I can do that?” Thus, faith appears as 
an unnecessary and insufficient condition and, from a phenomenological point of 
view, comparing to the Husserlian reduction as a counter-reduction.  
Faithful consciousness transfigures the appeared phenomenon through 
its faith: for example, when seeing a human being who deserves blame, it tries to 
love him on account of the commandment of loving one’s neighbor, so it adds a 
certain quality to the other, which is inadequate from a phenomenological point 
of view. The other does not necessarily have such a quality, but faithful 
consciousness takes it from its faith. Transfiguring the phenomenological reality, 
the religious man does not impoverish it; on the contrary, he enriches it, giving it 
spiritual determinations that the reality itself seems, at first sight, not to have. 
Through this work of faith, all the phenomena can become religious, because God 
can work through everyone. This mental activity is not a falsification of the 
phenomena, because it neither contradicts, nor cancels them; instead, it is a 
spiritual enrichment, probably even the revelation of the spiritual meaning that 
those phenomena already have, but keep them opaque. 
This idea—that God can work through every phenomenon transfigured 
by faith—gives us the second meaning of religious phenomenon: it is the 
revelation of God’s power and love. Faith alone is not able to make miracles; it 
makes only transfigurations of the phenomena, building a world within one can 
imagine a happy life. When the power of God appears alongside this 
transfiguration as an answer to man’s faith, then there is a second-grade 
religious phenomenon. In this case, there is something more powerful, more 
revelated, more surprisingly, which is not only our religious opinion, but also a 
real revelation. God’s revelation overwhelms theological counter-reduction. 
We should make a distinction between two kinds of acts of the religious 
consciousness: on the one hand, the acts that faithful consciousness adds from 
within itself and, on the other hand, the acts of revelation, based on faith—which 
is, let us not forget, a gift and a work of God’s grace. A redoubtable objection arises 
here: our acts, do they not obstruct the possibility of God appearing from himself? 
Do our transcendental conditions create a God reducible to them and, in the end, 
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do we fail, as Feuerbach asserts, in front of a God created after our image? The 
answer to that objection could be: even though we bring our faith from ourselves, 
such an act of the consciousness is not sufficient for the non-intuitive appearance 
of God. God could not appear, and we remain only some kind of rationalist 
believers. The teachings of faith, which are received by way of revelation (The 
Holy Scripture and the Holy Tradition), are inefficient for an authentic mystical 
experience. Therefore, even though we bring our faith, askesis, and prayer, as 
“theological reduction,”31 “liturgical reduction,”32 and “eschatological reduction,”33 
this is not an actual a priori, because the authentic a priori is the work and the 
grace of the Holy Spirit. When Christ the Truth comes to us and we receive Him, 
such an experience overwhelms any previous concept, human effort or 
intellectual faith. 
It is obvious that those appearances belong to the mystical theology 
rather than to Husserlian phenomenology. They advance into the field of theology 
and belong to philosophy only by language. However, if the analyzed phenomena 
are the texts of the Bible or the liturgical experience, the phenomenological 
method could be appropriate and could show the faith manifested from 
themselves. There is no faith of the phenomenologist, but, for example, the faith 
proclaimed by the biblical texts becomes phenomena in order to be analyzed. As 
a result, faith appears even for phenomenological thought while it describes 
phenomena of the Christian revelation. When the phenomenologist is also a 
believer, he understands better what he describes in the field of theology, but he 
keeps the distinction between the two domains. Working behind its reductions, 
phenomenology cannot “validate” the teachings of the faith but can only describe 
them. The frontier between theology and phenomenology passes through that 
possibility of “validation,” so the difference between a phenomenologist and a 
theologian is not in the manner in which they describe the phenomena—both of 
them should describe them similarly but in the fact that the theologian believes 
they are true and tries to live according to them. 
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The answers to the question about the appearance of Christ the Truth 
involves overcoming the Husserlian epoché. Firstly, through some absolute and 
non-phenomenological discourses and by ignoring phenomenological reduction. 
Secondly, by broadening the meaning of the reduction in such a way that the 
impossibility of God’s appearance becomes a possibility; not due to our a priori 
categories, but to the appearance of the Truth himself, as a revelation, coming from 
himself—Jean-Luc Marion’s answer. Thirdly, the Truth can show himself after a 
theological counter-reduction visible in the phenomena of faith; in this case, the 
eidetic reduction could remain active, but the transcendental reduction—the 
Husserlian epoché—could not. It is in the realm of theology where the conditions 
of possibility are doubled by the divine grace, in order to receive Christ the Truth 
in amazement. Such a gifted “transcendental,” an a posteriori one, is the grace of 
God, through which man can participate in the mystery of Trinitarian love. 
As Christ the Truth is not an epistemological notion, He appears in the 
communion in which the believer comes not only by his faith—a gift from God 
too—but also with what he does not have, by God’s grace. By grace, he receives 
the spiritual gaze and can see and understand, as far as he can, the unseen and 
the unknowing of God. An objection might reply that, at that level, there is only 
spirituality and not phenomenology, that the believer posits faith and the 
phenomenological reduction is annihilated. However, the phenomenon of faith 
points beyond itself, towards the God who has always gifted it and has manifested 
Himself through the work of the Holy Spirit. If this last way leads to the 
overcoming of phenomenology, then it is time for one last rhetorical question: 
when we are talking about God, isn’t it legitimate for theology to be the fulfillment 
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